Western
observers often place Middle East actors and their motives into
well-intentioned but partially inaccurate or sometimes misleading categories.
For example, the three major groups in Iraq are labeled as Shiites, Sunnis and
Kurds. The first two are religious categories, while the third is ethnic. The
majority of Kurds are Sunni, and the majority of Iraqi Shiites are ethnically
Arabs. So the right, albeit inconvenient, categories would be Sunni-Kurds,
Sunni-Arabs and Shiite-Arabs.
These
categories would be trivial details if it weren't for the fact that Middle
Eastern realities of these labels do not always overlap with established
western understanding. For instance, those in the Middle East who call
themselves "secularists" would be perceived in the west as the
"good guys" who believe in democracy and separation of church and state.
But Turkey's historic
self-proclaimed "secularists" in practice were anything but secular
or democratic. As Edhem Eldem, Professor of History at Istanbul's prestigious
Bogazici University observed, Turkish
"secularism" often "marginalized and oppressed those who openly
displayed their beliefs; head-scarf-wearing women were banned from
universities, and few protections were given to religious minorities." The
government ran every single mosque and prescribed the preachers' sermons.
Turkey's self-proclaimed secularists were also aggressive nationalists, who
denied millions of Kurdish citizens their cultural rights, including the right
to speak their mother tongue. Those who did not embrace the official government
ideology were sometimes beaten and jailed.
Counter-intuitive to a
western audience, on the other side were participants of the Hizmet social
movement, originated by Turkey's most influential preacher and social advocate,
Fethullah Gulen, who advocated for democracy, equal opportunity and social justice,
and defended religious rights of all faiths in Turkey, including Orthodox Christians and Jews. Gulen's sympathizers started
free tutoring centers in Turkey's Southeast, serving tens of thousands of
children from low-income families, often of Kurdish descent, helping protect
them from recruitment by terrorist organizations operating around Turkey's
borders.
In 2008, when the
Turkish judiciary prosecuted military officials charged with planning or
perpetrating military coups, western media called it a struggle between
Islamists and Seculars. In reality, as correctly observed by Dr. John Esposito of
Georgetown University, it was a struggle between pro-democracy
groups and those military officers who were found guilty of some of the worst
crimes against their fellow citizens. Kurdish citizens, many of who saw their
loved ones disappear under military-dominated periods, celebrated this
development alongside journalists who were intimidated or fired from their jobs
during the same periods.
Last month, when Hizmet representatives
criticized the government-proposed legislation that calls for banning exam prep
schools, Turkish and Western journalists labeled this opposition as a feud between Prime Minister Erdogan
and Mr. Gulen because
roughly 15-25 percent of these prep schools were founded by Hizmet participants
according to variousestimates.
But
that is an oversimplification because this underlying struggle is between
democracy and free enterprise on the one hand against government overreach and
authoritarianism on the other. If enacted, this legislation would make Turkey
the only country in the world to ban a whole category of legitimate private
enterprise -- and that too, one that provides math, science and language arts
training to children of low-income families who cannot afford private tutoring.
It is ironic that the
Turkish ruling party (AKP) that fought against government overreach during
their first term 2003-2007 has, since then, taken steps that completely
contradict its earlier record. From recent discourse on regulating student
homes and government's heavy-handed reaction to Gezi Park protests, to restrictions on freedom of the press,
Turkey is rekindling its historic struggle between those committed to democracy
and those who benefit from authoritarianism and dominance.
Turkey
is often cited as an example for struggling Middle East countries such as Egypt
and Tunisia; after all, Turkey experienced a similar transition 60 years ago.
But as the Turkish experience shows, democracy is a messy process with a steep
learning curve. It sometimes can seem like too much to ask of both governments
and the governed to have patience to learn the difference between legitimate
democratic opposition and rebellion; enforcement and oppression. Nevertheless,
abandoning the path to democracy is not an option.
What
was termed an Arab spring is actually a beginning of the fall of authoritarian
regimes that will hopefully lead to a spring of democracy. But let's be
prepared that spring will come only after a harsh winter of authoritarian
establishments resisting democratizing reforms. What is clear is that people in
the Middle East yearn for their freedoms, and we hope that their struggle leads
them toward democracy and away from the yoke of domination. For outside
observers, understanding this struggle requires going beyond the convenient
labels of the news headlines.
Dr. Aslandogan is the President
of the Alliance for Shared Values, a non-profit that represents interfaith
dialogue organizations affiliated with Hizmet in the U.S.
Monday, May 05, 2014
